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I. Introduction 
Pity the poor Artistic License version 1.0 (ALv1). The Free Software Foundation criticizes the license as “too vague” with 
some passages “too clever for their own good.”1 The Open Source Initiative suggests that it has been *336 “superseded.”2 
ALv1’s authors at the Perl Foundation even acknowledge its flaws.3 Yet it is the ALv1, not the venerable GNU General 
Public License (GPL), which the Federal Circuit upheld in Jacobsen v. Katzer,4 establishing at long last that open source 
licenses are enforceable.5 
  
Although that outcome received most of the headlines, the case’s greater significance lies elsewhere. Jacobsen v. Katzer 
teaches valuable lessons about conditions and covenants in license contracts, lessons that apply to software licenses of all 
persuasions, open source and binary use alike. Moreover, the case raises an important issue about the interplay between 
contract and intellectual property law: can licensors manipulate the distinction between covenants and conditions in such a 
way that upsets the delicate balance in copyright law? 
  
  
This article begins with a short description of open source licensing, followed by a discussion of the Jacobsen v. Katzer case 
and the lessons that it teaches about license contracts. Then, this article presents the questions left unresolved by Jacobsen v. 
Katzer: (1) Can licensors manipulate the distinction between covenants and conditions, thereby positioning themselves to 
obtain copyright remedies, particularly injunctive relief, on top of contract remedies; (2) If so, does this unwisely enhance a 
licensor’s power under copyright law, tipping the balance too far in the direction of copyright holders? 
  
The article explores two approaches to resolving this open issue. One approach leaves the distinction between pure covenants 
and license conditions in the hands of the contracting parties. The other approach attempts to create a principled distinction 
between pure covenants and license conditions. This article concludes that leaving the distinction to the contracting parties, 
though not perfect, better supports business model innovation, particularly open source licensing, which contributes 
significantly to innovation and healthy competition in the software industry. Courts can temper the power of licensors when 
necessary by utilizing the boundaries already inherent in intellectual property licensing law. These boundaries, coupled with 
prudence in granting injunctive relief for breach of license conditions, should maintain the appropriate balance within 
copyright law while preserving the positive role of license contracts. 
  
*337 II. A Rapid Primer on Open Source Licensing 
Although open source licensing seemed mysterious in the past, many commentators have now described its nature and 
purposes.6 Here are the basics, beginning with the “open source” nomenclature. The word “source” refers to software in its 
source code form. Programmers write software in source code using a computer language such as Basic or C. Anyone 
proficient in the computer language can read and understand the source code. 
  
The word “open” generally7 refers to the Open Source Definition (OSD).8 An organization called the Open Source Initiative9 
created the OSD, which sets out general principles that a license must meet to be considered (at least by its reckoning) “open 
source.” For example, the OSD requires that an open source license grant the unencumbered right to make modifications and 
distribute the licensed software.10 The Free Software Foundation (FSF)11 prefers the term “free” rather than “open” because it 
emphasizes that the goal is to keep the software “free as in freedom.”12 As the debate continues about which term is more 
apt,13 many *338 people simply refer to the software as FOSS--Free and Open Source Software or, for those who like adding 
a reference to the more illustrative word “libre” (clarifying that it’s about “free speech, not free beer”14), some use “FLOSS.”15 
  
Open source software stands in contrast to binary use software16 (BUS), typically called proprietary17 or commercial18 
software, which is software licensed in object code form primarily for end use only.19 Binary (or object) code is software in 
machine readable form which cannot be understood by humans. When distributed in binary form, software retains the secrecy 
of its inner workings (bolstered by provisions in the license contract against decompiling)--this is important because some 
programmers, especially software firms such as Microsoft and Adobe,20 view these inner workings as a valuable trade secret.21 
Beyond *339 retention of trade secrets, many programmers employ binary use licensing because so few software users have 
the skill or interest in looking at or modifying source code. 
  
Despite the differences between FOSS and BUS, they share one important characteristic: a copyright on the software code, 
combined with a license of the code, creates the legal framework for the transaction model.22 As one prominent open source 
group says: “To stay free, software must be copyrighted and licensed.”23 FOSS relies on license contracts and so does BUS; 
they only differ in the particular contract terms used.24 
  
Software developers who license BUS use a wide variety of license contracts with their software. The software industry calls 
these “end user license agreements” (EULAs) or “mass market” software licenses; in popular terminology, “shrink wrap or 
click wrap licenses.”25 When it comes to open source license contracts, the Open Source Initiative has approved over 60 
licenses as complying with the OSD.26 Despite this diversity,27 most open source programmers use28 either GPL 2.029 or some 
variation of the BSD License.30 
  
*340 III. Jacobsen v. Katzer: A Traditional Story with a Contemporary Twist 
The story of Jacobsen v. Katzer begins in a traditional setting--with a hobbyist, Robert Jacobsen, sharing his software.31 In 
this case, Jacobsen and a community of contributing developers created a software program called DecoderPro to control 
  
model trains.32 The legal vehicle used to share DecoderPro was ALv1.33 Most developers use this license because it requires 
attribution of authorship in a variety of ways, so presumably Jacobsen chose it for that reason. 
  
Enter Matthew Katzer and his company KAM Industries (collectively, “Katzer”). Katzer developed a competing software 
product called Decoder Commander.34 At some point, someone at Katzer used portions of DecoderPro in Decoder 
Commander.35 In doing so, Katzer did not provide the forms of attribution called for in ALv1.36 
  
Jacobsen objected to Katzer’s failure to provide proper attribution.37 In the course of discussions between the parties, Katzer 
accused Jacobsen of patent infringement38--a common twist in contemporary39 software disputes. This led Jacobsen to sue 
Katzer, seeking a declaratory judgment that he had not infringed Katzer’s patent.40 As one would expect, the parties added 
copyright, trademark, tort, and other causes of action to the litigation.41 Eventually, Jacobsen sought a preliminary injunction, 
arguing that Katzer’s violation of the terms of ALv1 constituted copyright infringement.42 
  
The District Court denied Jacobsen’s request because: “The condition that the user insert a prominent notice of attribution 
does not limit the scope of the license. Rather, Defendants’ alleged violations of the conditions of the license may have 
constituted a breach of the nonexclusive license, but does not create liability for *341 copyright infringement where it would 
not otherwise exist.”43 In other words, Katzer’s failure to provide attribution might breach the parties’ contact but it did not 
infringe Jacobsen’s copyright.44 As a result, the likelihood of Jacobsen getting his preferred (perhaps only) remedy, injunctive 
relief, would be remote because injunctive relief is common for copyright infringement but granted rarely for breach of 
contract.45 
  
Jacobsen appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.46 Although the U.S. Congress established the 
Federal Circuit to decide patent law appeals,47 other intellectual property-related disputes may come before the court48 
because, if a case “arises under” patent law, the Federal Circuit decides all issues.49 Because Katzer claimed patent 
infringement and Jacobsen challenged that via an action for declaratory judgment, the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over 
the entire case.50 Several open source-related organizations,51 led by Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society and including 
the Open Source Initiative, filed an amicus brief in support of Jacobsen’s position.52 
  
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court’s judgment in a unanimous opinion written by Judge 
Hochberg,53 a District Court judge from New *342 Jersey joining the Federal Circuit panel by designation.54 Clearly, the 
Federal Circuit understood open source software and the importance of its licensing: “Open source licensing has become a 
widely used method of creative collaboration that serves to advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few 
could have imagined just a few decades ago.”55 “There are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the creation 
and distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that range far beyond traditional license royalties.”56 
  
The Federal Circuit focused on the District Court’s decision that the attribution requirements in ALv1 sounded in contract 
rather copyright: “The heart of the argument on appeal concerns whether the terms of the Artistic License are conditions of, 
or merely covenants of, the copyright license.”57 “The District Court did not expressly state whether the limitations in the 
Artistic License are independent covenants or, rather, conditions to the scope; its analysis, however, clearly treated the license 
limitations as contractual covenants rather than conditions of the copyright license.”58 
  
In contrast to the District Court, the Federal Circuit concluded that ALv1 contained conditions on the license grant.59 It first 
pointed to the preamble of ALv1, which says: “The intent of this document is to state the conditions under which a Package 
may be copied.”60 It then turned to ALv1’s license grant provision, which granted a license “provided that” certain obligations 
were met.61 Looking to basic contract case law, the Federal Circuit ruled that the wording “provided that” normally denotes a 
condition.62 According to the Federal Circuit: “The copyright holder here expressly stated the terms upon which the right to 
modify and distribute the material depended . . .”63 “A copyright holder can grant the right to make certain modifications, yet 
retain his right to prevent other *343 modifications. Indeed, such a goal is exactly the purpose of adding conditions to a 
license grant.”64 
  
The balance of the Federal Circuit’s opinion addressed whether injunctive relief was appropriate in cases where conditions on 
copyright licenses were ignored.65 The answer: “yes,”66 as established many years ago in the U.S. federal courts.67 “Copyright 
licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; money damages alone do not support or enforce that right.”68 The 
Federal Circuit explained how injunctive relief is particularly appropriate and important for open source licenses where the 
software is often provided to the public at no charge.69 According to the court: “. . . [T]hese types of license restrictions might 
be rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce through injunctive relief.”70 
  
  
IV. Four Lessons From Jacobsen v. Katzer 
Jacobsen v. Katzer teaches four primary lessons: 
  
The first lesson taught by Jacobsen v. Katzer is that if a licensee fails to abide by a condition placed on a license grant, then 
he or she infringes the licensor’s copyright.71 In other words, ignoring the condition not only breaches a contract, it infringes a 
copyright. It is worth noting that this lesson is hardly a new one.72 It is an important one, however, because of its relationship 
to the second lesson. 
  
The second lesson taught by Jacobsen v. Katzer is that courts can grant injunctive relief for breaches of open source 
licenses.73 As the Federal Circuit highlighted in Jacobsen, injunctive relief74 is particularly critical in open source *344 
licensing because the standard remedy for breach of contract, monetary damages, normally is beside the point.75 Instead, 
FOSS licensors hope to prevent further copying, distribution, or modification of their software by those who fail to abide by 
open source license terms or, better yet, to obtain an affirmative injunction to, for example, require public release of the 
licensee’s source code76 or proper attribution. Like the first lesson, this lesson is not a new one-- courts have long granted 
injunctive relief in copyright licensing cases.77 Indeed, courts presume the irreparable harm needed to obtain an injunction in 
copyright cases (although that may change after eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).78 
  
The third lesson is that license provisions fall into two categories: a pure contractual covenant or a license condition.79 I use 
the word “pure” (some courts use “independent”80 or “mere”81) to highlight that some provisions in license contracts do not 
have any copyright implications.82 “Pure” contrasts with “blended”--a license condition is a blended contractual covenant in 
that it blends features of contract and copyright. As such, breach of a license condition covenant can trigger copyright 
infringement, not merely breach of contract.83 Pure contractual covenants, as previously mentioned, only can trigger breach of 
contract.84 Thus, the distinction is vital because of the teaching of lesson two about the importance of injunctive relief in open 
source licensing. 
  
*345 Like lessons one and two, lesson three is not new news.85 The pure covenant versus license condition distinction played 
a significant role in the Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft case in which Sun claimed that Microsoft had breached a license for 
Java technology.86 While this third lesson is simple to articulate, its application can be complex87 and raises issues not 
resolved by Jacobsen v. Katzer.88 
  
The final lesson: contract law applies to open source licenses.89 This will come as no surprise to most readers--in fact, most 
would be surprised if it did not.90 However, Eben Moglen,91 former general counsel for the FSF and one of the most 
influential lawyers in the free software community, has argued that free software licenses are “pure licenses,” not contracts.92 
Two primary issues probably fueled the need to argue for this distinction: (1) a fear that, by calling it a contract, injunctive 
relief would not be available; (2) a concern that certain contract formalities could not be met, primarily manifestation of 
assent by the licensee and exchange of consideration.93 
  
*346 Confusion in the open source community about the meaning of the term “license” also may have played a role. There 
seems to be a mistaken belief that things are either licenses or contracts when, in fact, most of the time94 they are both 
contracts and licenses--that is, contracts that contain licenses. To be most accurate, the entire contract should be called the 
“license contract”95 and the rights-granting part of that license contract should be called the “license.”96 
  
In any event, many commentators have disputed the merits of the pure license concept.97 They point out, among other things, 
that some open source licenses may be unilateral contracts, but they are contracts nonetheless. Perhaps more significantly, the 
“pure license” concept is an artifact. The concerns that drove the creation of the concept in the early 1990s, when Stallman 
wrote GPL 2.0, now have abated.98 As confirmed in Jacobsen v. Katzer, a FOSS programmer can get injunctive relief if a 
licensee acts outside the scope of the license.99 Moreover, Jacobsen confirmed that open source licenses do not lack 
consideration,100 and there is little doubt they otherwise meet the standards required by modern contract law for providing the 
prerequisites to an enforceable contract: an opportunity to review and manifestation of assent.101 
  
*347 V. Distinguishing Between Pure Covenants and License Conditions: Complexities and Open Issues 
  
Sometimes sorting out whether a particular provision should be considered a license condition or a pure covenant will be 
straight forward. The analysis may begin and end with a look at the license grant provision. The license grant from the 
Simple Public License 2.0 (SimPL)102 provides a useful illustration. It says: 
You get the royalty free right to: 
  
  
• Use the software for any purpose; 
  
• Make derivative works of it (this is called a “Derived Work”); 
  
• Copy and distribute it and any Derived Work. 
  
If you distribute the software or a Derived Work, you must give back to the community by: 
  
• Prominently noting the date of any changes you make; 
  
• Leaving other people’s copyright notices, warranty disclaimers, and license terms in place; 
  
• Providing the source code, build scripts, installation scripts, and interface definitions in a form that is easy to get and best to 
modify; 
  
• Licensing it to everyone under SimPL, or substantially similar terms (such as GPL 2.0), without adding further restrictions 
to the rights provided; 
  
• Conspicuously announcing that it is available under that license.103 
  
The SimPL’s license grant provision describes the rights granted in three bullet points. Immediately following the description 
of the rights granted, the license states that “if you distribute the software or a Derived Work, you must give back to the 
community by” abiding by five bulleted conditions.104 The “must give back” requirements tie directly back to the preceding 
grant of rights, thus making them license conditions rather than pure covenants. 
  
*348 By design, the SimPL uses informal words105 to alert the reader that the license grant comes with conditions. Licenses 
using a more formal tone might use the words “provided that,” “only if,” or “on the condition that” to signify that the license 
grant contains conditions. Indeed, many complex licenses have an entire section or several sections labeled “License 
Conditions.”106 
  
But things do not always come so neatly packaged. Let’s change the terms of the SimPL to illustrate. What if, instead, the 
SimPL said: 
You get the royalty free right to: 
  
  
• Use the software for any purpose; 
  
• Make derivative works of it (this is called a “Derived Work”); 
  
• Copy and distribute it and any Derived Work. 
  
You give back to the community by: 
  
• Prominently noting the date of any changes you make; 
  
• Leaving other people’s copyright notices, warranty disclaimers, and license terms in place; 
  
• Providing the source code, build scripts, installation scripts, and interface definitions in a form that is easy to get and best to 
modify; 
  
  
• Licensing it to everyone under SimPL, or substantially similar terms (such as GPL 2.0), without adding further restrictions 
to the rights provided; 
  
• Conspicuously announcing that it is available under that license. 
  
No particular words (such as “provided that”) signal that the requirements in the five bullets place conditions on the license 
grant. In fact, nothing indicates clearly that the five bullets tie back to the license grant at all. Are they conditions on the 
license grant or pure covenants? It’s hard to say. But, of course, this conclusion will not suffice if a client asks the question: 
What can I do if someone is ignoring a term in my license (or, for a licensee client, what can happen to me if I failed to abide 
by a term)? The conclusion will also not suffice if interpretation of the license gets disputed in court. 
  
When faced with interpreting a contract, American courts endeavor to discern the intent of the parties.107 If a contract is 
integrated, most courts will not look beyond the words of the contract document itself,108 although some may consider *349 
other evidence to help interpret ambiguous terms.109 Courts may apply various cannons of construction from the law of 
contracts: interpret the disputed provision in light of other provisions in the contract; look to course of dealing or 
performance; look to industry practice; construe terms against the drafter.110 With respect to covenants and conditions, there is 
some authority for the proposition that state contract laws should presume that provisions are covenants rather than 
conditions in the absence of compelling evidence.111 
  
A. A Complexity: Whose Intent? Should the Form Drafter’s Intent Matter? 
In open source licensing, what is the intent of the parties? Sometimes this is difficult to discern. Programmers often pick an 
open source license form without detailed knowledge of its terms. In general, they pick the GPL if they support the Free 
Software Foundation’s “free software” philosophy; if not, they select the BSD License.112 Of course this is an 
over-simplification because FOSS programmers use many other open source licenses, but it gives a sense of the mindset of 
the typical open source developer who selects a license based on a philosophical viewpoint rather than any detailed 
understanding of the terms of the license contract.113 
  
Should the form drafter’s intent play any role in interpreting the license? Open source programmers often act as if it matters, 
particularly in the case of the *350 GPL. The Free Software Foundation has an extensive FAQ document dealing with its 
interpretation of the GPL.114 The effort to document the Free Software Foundation’s views on its interpretation of the new 
GPL version 3.0 through its sister organization, the Software Freedom Law Center, have been particularly extensive.115 
  
But should it matter from a legal point of view? Often the answer will be clearly “no.” If a programmer uses the BSD 
License, for instance, it is doubtful that the intent of its author (the University of California) would be particularly relevant. 
Arguably, however, the form drafter’s intent may matter if the licensor chose the license to signal that he or she is part of a 
particular open source community, or the licensee chose the software because of that signal.116 In this situation, the open 
source license serves as something like a social compact or constitution117 as well as a contract. In U.S. contract law this may 
be evidence of trade usage or industry custom118 although this normally will not prevail over the specific terms of a contract.119 
  
To the extent it is relevant, the form drafter’s intent should not be dispositive. The licensor or licensee may not be well 
schooled in the form drafter’s interpretation of the finer points of the license form and, even if they are, may not agree with it. 
A famous disagreement with the Free Software Foundations’ interpretation of the GPL came to light when Linus Torvalds, 
author of Linux, felt compelled to add an explanatory note120 to clarify that he did not agree with the *351 Free Software 
Foundation’s expansive interpretation of when the “share alike” provision of the GPL was triggered.121 
  
B. An Open Issue: License Condition or Pure Covenant--Do the Parties Always Get to Choose? 
The most important question left open by Jacobsen v. Katzer is this: To what extent can license drafters choose whether a 
particular license provision is a pure covenant or a license condition? Of particular importance is this related question: Can 
the parties turn any provision, any provision at all, into a license condition and thereby trigger a copyright infringement in the 
event of breach? The Federal Circuit (in a footnote) seems to indicate that the context matters in determining the character of 
a given provision--the same provision may be either a condition or a pure covenant, depending on how it is used in the 
  
license contract.122 That is certainly true, but is a license infinitely malleable? 
  
Let’s turn to an example from GPL 3.0 (GPLv3), the newly minted version of the GPL.123 GPLv3 contains a provision whose 
purpose is to thwart the use of digital rights management (DRM) technology.124 As a short hand, let’s call this the “DRM 
Section.” The DRM Section, new to GPLv3, is one of the key provisions that, according to Richard Stallman, justify 
switching to it from GPLv2.125 
  
*352 The DRM Section follows a provision labeled “2. Basic Permissions” and comes before provisions labeled “4. 
Conveying Verbatim Copies,” “5. Conveying Modified Source Versions,” and “6. Conveying Non-Source Forms.”126 The 
latter four provisions clearly read like license grants with accompanying license conditions. The DRM Section, though 
situated in the midst of licenses, is not connected to the licenses in any obvious way.127 It does not, on the face of it, look to be 
a condition on any of the surrounding license grants. It appears to be a standalone contractual provision; in other words, a 
pure covenant. 
  
It is unclear whether the FSF intended this or not.128 Let’s assume that it did not--that, the FSF really intended to create a 
license condition in order to trigger a copyright infringement129 if a licensee breached the DRM Section. Next let’s assume 
that the FSF decided to revise the current DRM Section to clarify that the section is a license condition rather than a pure 
covenant. It could easily do this by adding the following language to the DRM clause: “The licenses in Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6 
are expressly conditioned on your compliance with the terms and conditions of Section 3 [The DRM Section].” 
  
*353 Should the FSF or any other license drafter have the freedom to change a pure covenant into a license condition with 
the express purpose of enhancing the remedies available for breach of the provision? Starting from the premise of freedom of 
contract, a core underpinning of U.S. contract law, the answer seems to be “yes,” the parties can structure their contract as 
they see fit. If one side does not want a provision to be characterized as a license condition, then it can negotiate to change 
that. Indeed, a powerful or clever licensee could negotiate so that provisions that normally serve as license conditions are 
phrased as pure covenants to avoid the possibility of injunctive relief. In the case of a standard form, the prospective licensee 
can refuse the license on that basis. 
  
At one level, this seems correct, but would this be true for every conceivable provision? What about royalty-related 
provisions130-- either a provision that requires payment131 or a provision such as GPLv3 § 10 that prohibits royalties? For 
example, should the following provisions trigger a copyright infringement? First, in a hypothetical royalty bearing license 
contract: “Subject to the timely payment of royalties under the license contract, licensor grants you the following rights . . 
.”132 Second, in a hypothetically revised GPLv3: “Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6 are expressly conditioned on your compliance with 
the requirements in Section 10.” To take this to the logical extreme, should the following license grant trigger a copyright 
infringement for breach of literally any provision in the license contract: “Conditioned upon licensee’s compliance with each 
and every provision of this Agreement, licensor grants the following rights . . .” ?133 
  
So if a clever lawyer can draft virtually any provision to look and to work like a license condition, this raises important 
questions: Do the parties always get to elect whether a provision is a license condition, or is there a principled distinction 
between a pure covenant and a license condition? Is there some deeper policy issue at stake in manipulating the distinction? 
Does manipulating the license condition/pure covenant distinction ever unfairly extend the power of the exclusive  *354 
rights granted under copyright law by expanding the prospects for injunctive relief?134 
  
To answer these questions, I begin by discussing two ways to view the distinction between pure covenants and license 
conditions. I comment on the implications of each view, including important ramifications for open source licenses. Finally, I 
discuss whether the boundaries inherent in licensing law might better address concerns related to the manipulation of the 
covenant/condition distinction than relying on the application of an analytical distinction between the two. 
  
1. The Distinction Between Pure Covenants and License Conditions: Two Views 
  
There are two ways to look at the distinction between a pure covenant and a license condition. 
  
a) One View: Conditions Must Touch on Copyrights 
  
In one view, only a condition touching on the exclusive rights135 under copyright qualifies as a license condition.136 To qualify 
as a condition on the right to copy, for instance, the condition should relate to issues such as: Copying onto what? Using what 
  
to make copies? How many copies? What type of copies? Who can make copies? For a condition on the right to distribute, 
the condition should relate to issues such as: Where (and where not)? When? To whom? By whom? For how long? For a 
condition on the right to make derivative works, the condition should relate to: What type of works? Who can make 
derivatives? Analytically, this approach seems to make sense--copyright violations triggered by breach of a license condition 
should actually invoke copyrights. The farther a purported condition strays from touching on an exclusive copyright, the less 
compelling the case that a licensee infringed a copyright by failing to abide by the condition.137 
  
*355 (i) Comments on this View 
  
The primary advantage of this view is that it checks the power of copyright licensors. Restraining the proliferation of license 
conditions ameliorates concerns that copyright holders might use license contracts to tip the balance of copyright in favor of 
copyright holders. A rein on copyright holders may be especially important now that copyright protection has reached new 
(and some would say unhealthy) heights.138 
  
However, one ramification of this view is that many purported license conditions in open source licenses would not be 
classified as such, even though the license drafter clearly intended to treat them as license conditions and they are 
fundamental to open source licensing. For example, the ALv1’s attribution conditions arguably fall into a gray area because 
they relate to moral rights139 but not directly to copying, distribution, or derivative works. In the GPL, many of the “share 
alike” provisions of the GPL might not qualify--they do not invoke copyrights, they simply require a set of reciprocal 
promises140 given in exchange for a broad license of all copyrights (the so-called copyleft which reverses all copyrights).141 
Finally, the DRM section in GPLv3, even if re-cast as a license condition, surely would not qualify as a license condition 
under this view. 
  
I am not suggesting that a rule should be crafted one way or the other simply because open source licensing stands to win or 
lose. In fact, both FOSS and BUS licensors stand to lose control under this view of license conditions142 because licensing law 
applies in equal measure to both--same legal tools, same legal rules.143 My comments simply illustrate that the approach 
crimps useful business model innovation characterized by open source licensing,144 the type of innovation *356 that is the 
hallmark of intellectual property licensing and a major contributor to overall technological innovation and healthy 
competition in the software industry.145 
  
b) A Second View--Parties Freely Choose the Label 
  
A second view is that a license condition is any condition that the parties place on the license grant.146 In this view, the parties 
have discretion to pick the label. If the parties say that something is a condition, it is one. This approach is supported by 
important public policies. 
  
As explained by the court in Jacobsen v. Katzer, the use of license contracts allows copyright holders to control147 what can be 
done with their works.148 This control is fundamental to holding a copyright.149 Also, as noted above, there is a strong sense in 
United States contract law that the parties should be able to structure their contractual arrangements as they see fit.150 The 
parties, better than the courts, know how to allocate the benefits and burdens of their bargain. This holds especially true for 
the allocation of risk. The issue of characterizing a provision as a pure covenant or a license condition fundamentally comes 
down to risk allocation--if the parties call a provision a license condition, then the risk to the licensee is greater because the 
licensor can obtain copyright remedies as well as contractual ones. 
  
(i) Comments on this View 
  
One might object that this view gives too much power to copyright licensors. Powerful or clever licensors, arguably, could 
characterize every conceivable provision as a license condition in order to enhance their opportunity for copyright remedies. 
Similar concerns have been raised in the past by commentators about licenses in general and mass market licenses in 
particular.151 For them, the *357 “control” described by the court in Jacobsen v. Katzer has a negative connotation.152 
  
Unfortunately, this negative connotation distracts from seeing the ways in which licensing contributes in a positive way to 
innovation and creativity, both in the ways in which things are produced and the ways in which they are brought to market. 
As open source licensing so nicely illustrates, licensing fosters flexibility and choice in both the creation and distribution of 
works.153 If someone can right-size a license, then that person is more likely to grant permission than to hold it back.154 
  
  
Moreover, we distort our thinking when we look at everything through the lens of powerful-BUS-licensor versus 
weak-consumer-licensee. Licensors come in all shapes and sizes: Adobe,155 MySQL,156 Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology,157 the Free Software and Linux Foundations, Richard Stallman, Eric Raymond (a founder of the Open Source 
Initiative),158 and, of course, Professor Robert Jacobsen. So do licensees: the United States government;159 IBM;160 *358 
Amazon.com;161 UPS; Wal-Mart; Linus Torvalds;162 President Obama;163 and, of course, Mr. Matthew Katzer. Legal rules 
should be created using this lens. 
  
2. Choosing Between the Two Views: Leaning On Licensing Law’s Boundaries 
  
As we can see from the discussion above, both views of proper license conditions have their good and bad sides. The first 
view respects authorial control and freedom of contract but increases the risk of expanding copyright.164 The second view 
keeps licensors in check but impinges on business model innovation. Which approach is best? On balance, allowing the 
parties to freely choose seems best because it allows innovative licensing models to flourish,165 such as open source 
licensing.166 
  
For example, open source licensing underlies the development of the Linux kernel.167 Even though we think of Linus 
Torvalds as the creator of Linux, the collaboration of hundreds of programmers and, from a legal point of view, hundreds of 
licensing transactions between Torvalds and those developers, formed Linux.168 On top of that, licensing allows the Linux 
kernel to be combined with GNU software from the Free Software Foundation to create a complete operating *359 system 
which, when distributed by firms such as IBM and Red Hat,169 competes vigorously in the market on quality and price with 
Microsoft’s Windows operating system and Sun Microsystems’ Solaris software.170 
  
This is not simply a matter of picking an approach that benefits FOSS for its own sake. Open source licensing serves the core 
purposes of copyright: increasing the creation and distribution of works.171 As articulated by the court in Jacobsen v. Katzer: 
“Open source licensing has become a widely used method of creative collaboration that serves to advance the arts and 
sciences in a manner and at a pace that few could have imagined just a few decades ago.”172 
  
In addition, relying on an analytical distinction between license conditions and pure covenants may not be the best way to 
temper potential abuses by licensors. The line is blurry and will be hard to draw. This hurts users of BUS and FOSS by 
undermining the certainty of contracts. 
  
More importantly, licensing law already curbs the power associated with copyright licensing through an array of boundaries 
placed around license contracts: cannons of contract construction (construed against the drafter), rules about contract 
formation, the doctrine of unconscionability, consumer protection law, the fundamental public policy override, federal law 
preemption, the doctrine of misuse, and antitrust law.173 Taken together, these work to keep overreaching licensing practices 
in check. For example, if a license condition seems to overly extend copyrights, then a court can strike it down as a copyright 
misuse,174 violation of the *360 Sherman Act,175 or find that it is preempted by federal law.176 It may be best to use these 
boundaries on license contracts, vigilantly enforced by the courts, to police any overextension of copyright power by a 
licensor’s manipulation of license conditions. 
  
However, in the context of license conditions one other thing will be critical: prudence in granting injunctions for breach of a 
license condition.177 Exercising prudence will safeguard against the effects of a licensor’s attempt to improperly expand 
copyright power via proliferation of license conditions.178 For example, the farther a license condition strays from touching on 
an exclusive copyright and the less it contributes positively to the underlying purposes of copyright law, the less compelling 
the case may be for emergency179 or affirmative injunctive relief.180 Moreover, for license conditions that scarcely touch on 
copyright, the court should not presume irreparable harm.181 In a sense, prudence of this nature in granting injunctive relief 
blends the two views of license conditions described in this Section, drawing wisdom from each approach. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
The open source community smiled when the Federal Circuit enforced the Artistic License in Jacobsen v. Katzer. The case 
teaches important lessons about *361 the enforceability of open source license contracts to be sure, but more important are 
the issues that it raises about pure covenants and license conditions for all licenses. When can we consider a particular 
provision a license condition, thereby triggering a copyright infringement for breach? Is the label solely in the control of the 
parties or should some overriding policy in copyright law play a role in the labeling? Although it is tempting to say that only 
  
conditions which touch on exclusive copyrights should qualify as license conditions, such an approach might prevent the 
enforcement of critical provisions of open source licenses such as the GPL. Instead, the best approach allows the parties to 
craft license conditions as they see fit but calls on courts to vigorously enforce the boundaries that already hem in license 
contracts and to exercise prudence in granting injunctions when license conditions scarcely touch on exclusive copyrights or 
serve the underlying goals of copyright. 
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